We model an isolated portion of a competitive supply chain as a M/M/1 make-tostock queue. The retailer carries finished goods inventory to service a Poisson demand process, and specifies a policy for replenishing his inventory from an upstream supplier. The supplier chooses the service rate, i.e., capacity, of his manufacturing facility, which behaves as a single-server queue with exponential service times. Demand is backlogged and both agents share the backorder cost. In addition, a linear inventory holding cost is charged to the retailer, and a linear cost for building production capacity is incurred by the supplier. The inventory level, demand rate and cost parameters are common knowledge to both agents. Under the continuous-state approximation that the M/M/1 queue has an exponential rather than geometric steady-state distribution, we characterize the optimal centralized and Nash solutions, and show that a contract with linear transfer payments replicates a cost sharing agreement and coordinates the system. We also compare the total system costs, the agents' decision variables and the customer service levels of the centralized versus Nash versus Stackelberg solutions.
Introduction
Within many supply chains, a devoted upstream agent, referred to here as the supplier, produces goods for a downstream agent, called the retailer, in a make-to-stock manner. Broadly speaking, the performance (e.g., service levels, cost to produce and hold items) of this isolated portion of the supply chain is dictated by three factors: (i) Retailer demand, which is largely exogenous but can in some cases be manipulated via pricing and advertising, (ii) the effectiveness of the supplier's production process and the subsequent transportation of goods, and (iii) the inventory replenishment policy, by which retailer demand is mapped into orders placed with the supplier. If the supplier and retailer are under different ownership or are independent entities within the same firm, then their competing objectives can lead to severe coordination problems: The supplier typically wants the retailer to hold as much inventory as possible, while the retailer prefers to hold very little inventory and desires rapid response from the supplier. These tensions may deteriorate overall system performance.
The recent explosion in the academic supply chain management literature is aimed at this type of multi-agent problem. Almost without exception, the papers that incorporate stochastic demand employ variants of one of two prototypical operations management models: The newsvendor model or the Clark-Scarf (1960) multi-echelon inventory model. One-period and two-period versions of newsvendor supply chain models have been studied intensively to address the three factors above; see Agrawal et al. (1999) , Cachon (1999) and Lariviere (1999) for recent reviews. Although many valuable insights have been generated by this work, these models are primarily useful for style goods and products with very short life cycles. More complex (multi-period, and possibly multi-echelon and positive lead time) supply chain models have been used to analyze the case where a product experiences ongoing production and demand. Of the three factors in the last paragraph, these multi-period supply chain models successfully capture the replenishment policy and have addressed some aspects of retailer demand, e.g., information lead times in the Clark-Scarf model (Chen 1999) , pricing in multi-echelon models with deterministic demand and ordering costs (Chen et al. 1999) , and forecast updates (Anupindi and Bassok 1999 in a multi-period newsvendor model and Tsay and Lovejoy 1999 in a multi-stage model). However, the Clark-Scarf model simplifies the supplier's production process, by assuming that lead times are independent of the ordering process, or equivalently, that the production process is an infinite-server queue.
In this paper, we use an alternative prototypical model, an M/M/1 make-to-stock queue, to analyze a supply chain. Here, the supplier is modeled as a single-server queue, rather than an infinite-server queue, and the retailer's optimal inventory replenishment strategy is a base stock policy. Because the production system is explicitly incorporated, these make-to-stock queues are also referred to as production-inventory systems. The M/M/1 make-to-stock queue was introduced by Morse (1958) , but lay mysteriously dormant for the next three decades, perhaps because the multi-echelon version of it lacked the attractive decomposition property of the Clark-Scarf model and traditional (i.e., make-to-order) queueing networks, except under some restrictive inventory policies (Rubio and Wein 1996) . Make-to-stock queueing systems have experienced a revival in the 1990s, including multi-product queues with (e.g., Katalan 1996, Markowitz et al. 2000) and without (e.g., Zipkin 1990, Wein 1992 ) setups, and single-product, multi-stage systems in continuous time (e.g., Buzacott et al. 1992 , Lee and Zipkin 1992) and discrete time (e.g., Glasserman and Tayur 1995 and Gavirneni et al. 1996 , building on earlier work by Federgruen and Zipkin 1986) . Although these papers either undertake a performance analysis or consider a centralized decision maker (Gaverneni et al. analyze their system under various informational structures, but not in a game-theoretic setting), the make-to-stock queue is amenable to a competitive analysis because it explicitly captures the trade-off between the supplier's capacity choice and the retailer's choice of base stock level. However, the model treats the third key factor in a naive way, by assuming that retailer demand is an exogenous Poisson process. Moreover, we assume that the system state, the demand rate and the cost parameters are known by each agent. While this assumption is admittedly crude, we believe it is an appropriate starting point for exploring competitive make-to-stock queues. In the only other contemporaneous multi-agent production-inventory study that we are aware of, Plambeck and Zenios (1999) take a significant step forward by analyzing a dynamic system with information asymmetry.
In an attempt to isolate -and hence understand -the impact of incorporating capacity into a supply chain model, we intentionally mimic Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . Their twostage Clark-Scarf model is quite similar to our M/M/1 make-to-stock queue: Both models have two players, assume linear backorder and holding costs for retailer inventory (where the backorder costs are shared by both agents), employ steady-state analysis, and ignore fixed ordering costs. The key distinction between the two models is that the production stage is an infinite-server queue and the supplier controls his (local or echelon) inventory level in Cachon and Zipkin, whereas in our paper the production stage is modeled as a single-server queue and the supplier controls the capacity level, which in turn dictates a steady-state lead time distribution. While Cachon and Zipkin's supplier incurs a linear inventory holding cost, our supplier is subjected to a linear capacity cost. A minor difference is that our queueing model is in continuous time, while Cachon and Zipkin's inventory model is in discrete time. In fact, to make our results more transparent and to maintain a closer match of the two models, we use a continuous-state approximation, essentially replacing the geometric steady-state distribution of the M/M/1 queue by an exponential distribution with the same mean.
After defining the model in §2, we derive the centralized solution in §3, where a single decision maker optimizes system performance, and the unique Nash equilibrium in §4, where the supplier and retailer minimize their own cost. The two solutions are compared in §5. We show that the Nash solution is always inefficient and that the magnitude of the inefficiency tends to be minimize when backorder costs are evenly split between the supplier and the retailer. We also analyze the Nash equilibrium in terms of service performance which is measured by the fraction of customers that are backlogged. As we would expect, the Nash solution provides a poorer service than the centralized one and the difference is minimized when the retailer absorbs most of the backorder costs. In this respect, we conclude that customers prefer that the penalty for shortages be absorbed primarily by the agent in direct contact with them. In §6, we describe a family of contracts based on transfer payments between the two players that coordinate the system; i.e., allows the decentralized system to achieve the same cost as the centralized system. The payments are selected in such a way that each player transfers a fixed fraction of its own cost to the other player. The resulting cost structure mimics a cost sharing agreement and thus coordinates the system. In §7, we analyze the Stackelberg games, where one agent has all the bargaining power. In terms of efficiency, the retailer's Stackelberg game dominates the supplier's Stackelberg game. However, from a customer service perspective, the supplier's Stackelberg game is preferable. Concluding remarks, including a comparison of our results to those of Cachon and Zipkin, are presented in §8.
The Model
Our idealized supply chain consists of a supplier providing a single product to a retailer. Retailer demand is modeled as a homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ. The retailer carries inventory to service this demand, and unsatisfied demand is backordered. The retailer uses a (s − 1, s) base stock policy to replenish his inventory. That is, the inventory initially contains s units, and the retailer places an order for one unit with the supplier at each epoch of the Poisson demand process. Because we assume that there are no fixed ordering costs, the retailer's optimal replenishment policy (given the supplier's irreversible capacity decision, described below) is indeed characterized by the base stock level s.
The supplier's production facility is modeled as a single-server queue with service times that are exponentially distributed with rate µ. The supplier is responsible for choosing the parameter µ, which will also be referred to as the capacity. The server is only busy when retailer orders are present in the queue. The supplier's facility behaves as a M/M/1 queue because the demand process is Poisson and a base stock policy is used. We assume that the supplier does not build any intermediate stock but rather replenishes retailer's final inventory directly. This assumption holds naturally if both player belong to the same company. Moreover, we believe this not a restrictive assumption if we consider the growing development of Vendor-Managed Inventory systems (VMI) that promote an efficient management of inventory avoiding any duplicity of stock among the members of the supply chain (e.g., Waller et al. (1999) ).
In our model, the selling price that the retailer charges the customer, the wholesale price that the retailer pays to the supplier, and the supplier's variable production cost are assumed to be given and constant. These conditions hold, for example, if we assume that the retailer and supplier operate in competitive markets. Because demand is exogenous, unsatisfied demand is backordered, and we use a long-run average cost criterion, it follows that the agents' revenues are independent of their actions, as long as their utilities are nonnegative. Hence, profit maximization and cost minimization lead to the same solution, and we employ a cost-minimization framework.
Each backordered unit generates a cost b per unit of time for the production-inventory system. As in Cachon and Zipkin, this backorder cost is split between the two agents, with a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] incurred by the retailer. The parameter α, which we refer to as the backorder allocation fraction, is exogenously specified in our model. Because much of the academic literature assumes α = 1, this assumption requires some discussion. The value of α depends on a variety of factors, such as the structures of the market and distribution channel, the bargaining power and reputation of the agents, and the customers' expectation (e.g., Stern et al. 1996) . At one extreme, if the supplier has a monopolistic (or well established) position in the market and uses an intensive distribution strategy with many competing retailers, then customers facing an inventory shortage at one retailer may buy the product from a different retailer. In this case, α will be near 1 and the retailer will bear the brunt of the backorder costs. At the other extreme, suppose the supplier is in a competitive market and either the retailer has a monopoly at the distribution level or the supplier uses an exclusive distribution strategy with a single retailer. In this situation, poor customer service at the retailer level will mostly harm the supplier; i.e., α will be near 0. Of course, various intermediate situations generate less extreme values of α.
In addition, the retailer incurs a cost for holding units on inventory. The magnitude of this holding cost depends, in general, on whether the system is centralized or decentralized. The reason for this difference lies in the financial component of the holding cost. In the decentralized setting, the retailer faces a financial cost for a unit on stock which is equal to the cost of purchasing the product from the supplier. This purchasing cost is the sum of production costs plus the supplier's margin. In the centralized case, however, the supplier's margin is just an internal transfer that does not show up in the accounting of the finan-cial holding cost. Therefore, we expect the holding cost to be larger in the decentralized case which is clearly a source of inefficiency with respect to the centralized chain (double marginalization, Spengler (1950) ). For simplicity, however, we do not make this distinction here. That is, we assume that there is single holding cost h per unit of inventory per unit of time paid by the retailer independent of the supply chain configuration. This assumption will hold naturally if the supplier and retailer belong to the same company or in industries for which physical holding costs dominates financial holding costs and/or there is a competitive market of low-margin suppliers.
On the other hand, the supplier pays the fixed cost of building production capacity. The capacity cost parameter c is per unit of product, so that cµ represents the amortized cost per unit of time that the supplier incurs for having the capacity µ; this fixed cost rate is independent of the demand level.
To make our results more transparent, we normalize the expected variable cost per unit time by dividing it by the holding cost rate h. Towards this end, we normalize the cost parameters as follows:h
To ease the notation, we hereafter omit the tildes from these cost parameters.
Let N be the steady-state number of orders at the supplier's manufacturing facility. If we assume for now that µ > λ (this point is revisited later), then N is geometrically distributed with mean ν −1 , where
This parameter, which represents the normalized excess capacity, is the supplier's decision variable in our analysis, and we often refer to it simply as capacity. To simplify our analysis, we assume that N is a continuous random variable, and replace the geometric distribution by an exponential distribution with parameter ν. This continuous-state approximation can be justified by a heavy traffic approximation (e.g., §10 of Harrison 1988), which allows the incorporation of general interarrival time and service time distributions and it is fairly accurate for all server utilization levels; in this case, ν in (2) would be divided by onehalf of the sum of the squared coefficients of variation of the interarrival and service time distributions, (c 2 a + c 2 s )/2, but we do not pursue this avenue here. Although this continuousstate approximation leads to slightly different quantitative results (the approximation tends to underestimate the optimal discrete base stock level), it has no effect on the qualitative system behavior, which is the object of our study.
The steady-state expected normalized variable cost per unit time for the risk-neutral retailer (C R ) and supplier (C S ) in terms of the two decision variables are given by
and
The Centralized Solution
As a reference point for the efficiency of the two-agent system, we start by finding the optimal solution to the centralized version of the problem, where there is a single decision maker that simultaneously optimizes the base stock level s and the normalized excess capacity ν. The steady-state expected normalized cost per unit time C for this decision maker is
The centralized solution is given in Proposition 1; see the Appendix for the proof.
Proposition 1
The optimal centralized solution is the unique solution to the first-order conditions
and is given by
The resulting cost is
By relation (6), the ratio of the base stock level, s, to the supplier's mean queue length, ν −1 , satisfies νs = ln(1 + b) at optimality. (The corresponding first-order conditions for the discrete inventory problem is ln(ν + 1)s = ln(1 + b), and so our continuous approximation can be viewed as using the Taylor series approximation ln(ν + 1) ≈ ν.) Although this ratio is independent of the capacity cost c, the optimal solution depends on c via s = νc according to (8) .
As expected, the optimal capacity level decreases with the capacity cost and increases with the backorder-to-holding cost ratio b. Similarly, because capacity and safety stock provide alternative means to avoid backorders, the optimal base stock level increases with the capacity cost and with the normalized backorder cost b. Finally, as expected, α plays no role in this single-agent optimization, because transfer payments between the retailer and the supplier do not affect the centralized cost.
The Nash Solution
Under the Nash equilibrium concept, the retailer chooses s to minimize C R (s, ν), assuming that the supplier chooses ν to minimize C S (s, ν); likewise, the supplier simultaneously chooses ν to minimize C S (s, ν) assuming the retailer chooses s to minimize C R (s, ν). Because each agent's strategy is a best response to the other's, neither agent is motivated to depart from this equilibrium.
In anticipation of subsequent analysis, we express the Nash equilibrium in terms of the backorder allocation fraction α. Let us also define the auxiliary function
which plays a prominent role in our analysis.
Proposition 2
The unique Nash equilibrium is
The resulting costs, C * R (α) and C * S (α), are
Proof: Let s * (ν) be the retailer's reaction curve, i.e., the optimal base stock level given a capacity ν installed by the supplier. Because (3) is concave in s, s * (ν) is characterized by the first-order condition νs * (ν) = ln(1 + αb).
Using a similar argument, we find that the supplier's reaction curve ν * (s) satisfies
The unique solution to (15)- (16) is (11)- (12), and substituting this solution into (3)- (4) yields (13)- (14) . Because f α (b) is decreasing in α and ln(1 + αb) is increasing in α for b > 0, it follows that as α increases, the retailer becomes more concerned with backorders and increases his base stock level, while the supplier cares less about backorders and builds less excess capacity.
The supplier's variable cost C * S (α) is a monotonically decreasing function of α that satisfies C * S (0) = 2 √ bc and C * S (1) = 0, and C * R (α) is a monotonically increasing function of α that satisfies
as shown in Figure 1 . (Many of the limits taken in this paper, e.g., α → 1, are implicitly taken to be one-sided.) To understand the unbounded retailer losses in (17) , note that for the extreme case α = 1, the supplier does not face any backorder cost and consequently has no incentive to build excess capacity, i.e, ν * 1 = 0. This corresponds to the null recurrent case of a queueing system with an arrival rate equal to its service rate. Consequently, the retailer is unable to maintain finite inventory (backorder plus holding) costs, and the supply chain is not operational in the Nash equilibrium.
Comparison of Solutions
In this section, we compare the centralized solution and the Nash equilibrium with respect to the total system cost, the agents' decisions, and the customer service level.
The Nash equilibrium is inefficient. The centralized solution is not achievable as a Nash equilibrium. By equations (6) and (15) , the first-order conditions are νs = ln(1 + b) in the centralized solution and νs = ln(1 + αb) in the Nash solution. Hence, the two solutions are not equal when α < 1, and the Nash equilibrium in the α = 1 case is an unstable system, as discussed earlier. The source of this inefficiency is the inability of the agents to fully replicate the centralized cost structure.
The magnitude of the inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium is typically quantified by comparing the costs under the centralized and Nash solutions. We follow Cachon and Zipkin and compute the competition penalty, which is defined as the percentage increase in variable cost of the Nash equilibrium over the centralized solution. By (5) and (8), the variable cost for the centralized solution is
and the variable cost C * α associated with the Nash equilibrium is, by (3)-(4) and Proposition 2,
Hence, the competition penalty is
× 100%, where
Surprisingly, the competition penalty in (18) is independent of the supplier's cost of capacity. This occurs because the centralized variable cost and the Nash variable cost are both proportional to √ c at optimality, which is a consequence of the particular functional form arising from the make-to-stock formulation. This penalty is a function of α and b, and we can simplify equation (18) for the limiting values of these two parameters. The function f α (b) is decreasing in α and f 1 (b) = 0. Hence, the competition penalty goes to ∞ as α → 1. This inefficiency occurs because as the retailer bears more of the backorder cost, the supplier builds less excess capacity, and in the limit the lack of excess capacity causes instability of the queueing system. At the other extreme,
as α → 0, and the competition penalty in this case is given by
This function is increasing in b, approaches zero as b → 0 and grows to ∞ as b → ∞. Hence, when the supplier incurs most of the backorder cost, the retailer holds very little inventory and the competition penalty depends primarily on the backorder cost; if this cost is low then the supplier has little incentive to build excess capacity, which leads to a small competition penalty because the centralized planner holds neither safety stock nor excess capacity in this case. In contrast, if the backorder cost is very high, the supplier cannot overcome the retailer's lack of safety stock, and his backorders get out of control, leading to high inefficiency. Turning to the backorder cost asymptotics, f α (b) → 1−α α as b → ∞, and the competition penalty approaches 1
This quantity vanishes at α = 0.5, is symmetric about α = 0.5, and approaches ∞ as α → 0 and α → 1. Thus, when backorders are very expensive, this cost component dominates both agents' objective functions when they care equally about backorders (α = 0.5), and their cost functions -and hence decisions -coincide with the centralized solution. However, when there is a severe imbalance in the backorder allocation (α is near 0 or 1), one of the agents does not build enough of his buffer resource, and the other agent cannot prevent many costly backorders, which is highly inefficient from the viewpoint of the entire supply chain. Finally, for the case b → 0, the competition penalty is given by
which is an increasing function of α. Consistent with the previous analysis, this penalty function vanishes as α → 0 and approaches ∞ as α → 1.
In summary, there are two regimes, (α = 0.5, b → ∞) and (α → 0, b → 0), where the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically efficient, and two regimes, α → 1 and (α → 0, b → ∞), where the inefficiency of the Nash solution is arbitrarily large. However, because equation (18) does not consider the agents' participation constraints, some of the large inefficiencies in the latter regimes may not be attainable by the supply chain (see Caldentey and Wein 1999) .
To complement these asymptotic results, we plot in Figure 2 the competition penalty in (18) for various values of b as a function of α. A new insight emerges from Figure 2 . The competition penalty is minimized by α near 0.5 (i.e., the backorder cost is split evenly) when the backorder-to-holding cost ratio b ≥ 1. Comparison of decision variables. Figure 3 depicts the optimal Nash production capacity ν * α and the optimal Nash base stock level s * α as a function of α, and allows us to compare these functions to the centralized solutions, ν * and s * . Excess capacity and the base stock level are alternative ways for the supplier and retailer, respectively, to buffer against demand uncertainty, and Figure 3 shows that the inefficiency of the Nash solution does not necessarily imply that these agents have less buffer resources in the Nash solution than in the centralized solution. For both decision variables, there exist thresholds on the value of α, denoted by α s and α ν in Figure 3 , that divide the regions where the agents have more or less buffer resources than the optimal centralized solution. However, as shown in the next proposition, at least one agent in the Nash equilibrium possesses less of his buffer resource than the central planner. has an absolute error bounded by 0.02. Thus, in the case where the backorder cost is well-quantified (e.g., a price discount for waiting, or the financial cost of delayed payments), knowledge of α s and α ν can be used to negotiate a contract that sets the backorder allocation fraction in the middle. For instance, if α < α * then the contract should include a fee of (α * − α)b that the retailer pays the supplier per unit of backorder per unit time. This fee would shift the retailer's backorder allocation fraction to the α * level. Similarly, if α > α * then the supplier should pay the retailer a fee of (α − α * )b per unit of backorder per unit time. This contract, while suboptimal, is conceptually simpler than the linear transfer payment in §6.
We cannot solve for α s and α ν in closed form, except when b takes on a limiting value. By (12), α s satisfies ln(1 + αb)
As . In this case, α s satisfies α 1−α = 1, or α s = 0.5. Numerical computations reveal that α s is unimodal in b, achieving a maximum of 0.627 at b = 1.48, and is rather insensitive to moderate values of the backorder-to-holding cost ratio b (e.g., α s ≥ 0.61 for b ∈ [1, 10] ). In other words, for moderate values of the normalized backorder cost, the Nash retailer holds more inventory than optimal when his share of the backorder cost is more than about 61%.
By (11) , α ν solves f α (b) = 1; i.e., when the normalized backorder cost is small, the Nash supplier holds a less-than-optimal level of capacity. As b → 0, this condition becomes √ 1 − α = 1, which gives α ν = 0. As b → ∞, the condition becomes 1−α α = 1, which is solved by α ν = 0.5. Note that α s = α ν = 0.5 as b → ∞ is consistent with our previous claim that the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically efficient in the regime (α = 0.5, b → ∞). A numerical study reveals that α ν is more sensitive than α s to the value of b. As the backorder-to-holding cost ratio b varies from 1 to 10, α ν ranges from 0.28 to 0.49.
Customer service level. The exponential distribution of the queue length implies that the steady-state probability that a customer is forced to wait because of retailer shortages is equal to P r(N ≥ s) = e −νs ; consequently, we refer to (1 − e −νs ) × 100% as the service level. By equations (6) and (15), the stockout probability e −νs equals (1 + b) −1 in the centralized solution and (1 + αb) −1 in the Nash solution. Hence, customers receive better service in the centralized solution than in the Nash equilibrium. This is because (see Figure 3) the product of the two buffer resources (normalized excess capacity and base stock level) is always smaller in the Nash equilibrium than in the centralized solution, and the customers suffer from this less-than-optimal level of collective buffer resource; this degradation in customer service in decentralized systems also occurs in the traditional bilateral monopoly model (e.g., Tirole 1997), where double marginalization leads to a higher price charged to the customer and less goods sold. Finally, even though the system is not stable for α = 1, customers generally desire a larger value of α; i.e., they prefer that the penalty for shortages be absorbed primarily by the agent in direct contact with them.
Contracts
We showed in §5 that the Nash equilibrium is always inefficient when the supply chain operates. In this section, we analyze a simple coordinating mechanism based on static transfer payments between the agents. Specifically, we assume that the supplier (or the retailer) agrees to transfer a fixed amount τ per unit time to the retailer (supplier) in order to improve his operations and eventually the operation of the whole chain. In its most general form, this transfer τ depends on both s and ν, that is, τ (s, ν). As in our earlier analysis, this information is assumed to be common knowledge. We believe this not a restrictive assumption since information sharing among entities in a supply chain is now common practice. Cachon and Zipkin also use a linear transfer payment based on inventory levels to coordinate their supply chain, and readers are referred to §1.5 of Cachon for a survey of alternative types of contracts in the multi-echelon inventory setting. We do not impose an explicit constraint that forces either agent to build a predefined level of its buffer resource. Using Cachon and Lariviere's (1997) terminology, we assume a voluntary compliance regime, where both the retailer and the supplier choose their buffer resource levels to maximize their own profits.
The transfer payment modifies the cost functions in (3)- (4) for the retailer and supplier, respectively, toC
The choice of τ (s, ν) that coordinates the system is not unique. One possibility is to define the transfer in such a way that the modified cost functions replicate a cost sharing situation.
That is, we can set τ (s, ν) such thatC S (s, ν) = γ C(s, ν) andC R (s, ν) = (1 − γ)C(s, ν) where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a splitting factor and C(s, ν) is the centralized cost function defined in (5) . For this cost sharing to happen the transfer payment must satisfy
In this situation, both agents have an objective which is a scaled version of the centralized one. Therefore, supplier and retailer have aligned objectives and the centralized solution (s * , ν * ) is the unique Nash equilibrium. We notice that the transfer payment has two components. First, γ C R (s, ν) is a payment made by the supplier to the retailer proportional to the retailer's cost. Similarly, −(1−γ)C S (s, ν) corresponds to a payment made by the retailer to the supplier proportional to the supplier's cost. In other words, each agent transfers a fraction of its own cost to the other player.
Although we appear to have a degree of freedom in splitting the costs via γ, both agents must be better off under the Nash equilibrium with the transfer payments than under the Nash equilibrium without the transfer payments, i.e.,
This condition can be rewritten as γ ∈ [γ α (b),γ α (b)], where
In addition, γ has to be in the [0, 1] range. If not, one of the players would have a negative cost function. In this situation, the optimal strategy for this player is to increase as much as possible the absolute value of its cost. For example, if γ < 0 then the supplier has a negative cost function and his/her best strategy is to pick ν as large a possible independently of the value of s. In summary, the centralize solution can be achieved using the transfer payment (24) 
if and only if
It is not hard to show that γ α (b) ≤γ α (b) and γ α (b) < 1; hence, coordination is always possible using this type of contract. This conclusion stems from the fact that the Nash equilibrium is inefficient and the cost reduction obtained using the centralized solution can be split, making both agents better off. After some algebra we get
where P α (b) is the competition penalty defined in (18) . Notice that the range of admissible γ (those that effectively coordinate the system), and hence the ease of negotiation, increases with the magnitude of the competition penalty. Two extreme cases deserve particular attention: γ α (b) < 0 andγ α (b) > 1. In these situations, there exists a coordinating contract having one of the agents fully subsidizing the other agent's operation, i.e., γ = 0 or γ = 1. When γ α (b) < 0 it is profitable for the retailer to absorb the supplier's variable cost (the reverse is true whenγ α (b) > 1)
1 . This type of behavior, where large manufacturers pay for their supplier's capital equipment, has been observed in the automobile industry (e.g., Dyer and Ouchi 1993, Dyer et al. 1998 ). Roughly speaking, we can show that for α ≥ 0.8 the retailer is willing to pay the supplier's cost in order to achieve coordination and the opposite holds for α ≤ 0.2.
As we pointed out, the transfer payment in (24) replicates a cost sharing situation in which both agents agree up-front to split the total cost of the supply chain. The transfer payment (24) simply materializes this cost sharing agreement. From a practical perspective, however, a direct cost sharing negotiation based on total cost probably dominates the transfer payment approach since it does not require any special accounting of cost (in terms of capacity and backordering costs) and it is more transparent, robust, and easier to implement.
The Stackelberg Games
We conclude our study of this two-stage supply chain by considering the case where one agent dominates.
Supplier's Stackelberg game. When the supplier is the Stackelberg leader, he chooses ν to optimize C S (s, ν) in (4), given the retailer's best response, s * (ν) in (15) . This straightforward computation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4
In the absence of participation constraints, the equilibrium in the supplier's Stackelberg game iss
The agents' costs are
Equation (26) implies thatν αsα = ν * α s * α , and hence the customer service level is the same under the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria. Because the first-order conditions of the centralized problem dictate the service level, it also follows that the Stackelberg equilibrium is inefficient relative to the centralized solution. Not surprisingly, the supplier builds less capacity and the retailer holds more safety stock in (26) than in the Nash equilibrium. The discrepancy between the Stackelberg and Nash solutions increases as α and b increase. Now we compare the variable cost of each agent and the entire system under the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. By (14) , the supplier's cost in the Nash equilibrium can be written as
The function
is strictly increasing in [0, ∞), and is equal to 1 when x = 0. Thus, it is always the case that C S (s α ,ν α ) ≤ C S (s * α , ν * α ); this is to be expected, because the supplier incorporates the retailer's best response when selecting his level of capacity. However, C S (s α ,ν α ) = C S (s * α , ν * α ) when α = 0, α = 1 or b = 0, and so the supplier does not benefit from being the leader in these extreme cases. When α = 1 or b = 0, the supplier does not face any backorder costs and builds no excess capacity (ν = 0). On the other hand, when α = 0 the retailer -incurring no backorder costs -holds no safety stock (s = 0). Because these choices (ν = 0 and s = 0) are independent of the bargaining power of the supplier in these cases, the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria provide the same cost to the supplier.
By (13) and (26), the difference in the retailer's cost between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium is
As expected, the retailer is worse off in the supplier's Stackelberg equilibrium than in the Nash equilibrium. By (8), (10), (12) and (28), the increase in the retailer's cost from being the follower vanishes as α → 0 and b → 0 (similar to the reasons given in the previous paragraph), and grows with α and b. As α gets larger, the supplier cares less about backorders and builds less capacity, leaving the retailer in a vulnerable situation. A comparison of the total system profit shows that
Condition (29) holds for large values of α, but is not true in general. Because the left side of (29) equals zero when α = 0, is increasing in α ≥ α 0 if it is increasing in α at α 0 , and has a derivative with respect to α equal to 1 − b 2
when α = 0, we conclude that for a backorder-toholding cost ratio b ≤ 2 the Nash solution achieves a lower system cost than the Stackelberg equilibrium for any value of α. If b > 2, the Nash solution is more efficient if and only if α >ᾱ, whereᾱ is the unique positive value of α that solves (29) with equality. Hence, overall system performance suffers when the retailer incurs most of the expensive backorder costs, and -as the follower -has less power than in the Nash equilibrium to control these costs.
Retailer's Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg problem is less tractable when the retailer is the leader. However, the following proposition (see the Appendix for a proof) characterizes the solution.
Proposition 5 Let (ν α ,ŝ α ) be the equilibrium when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader in the absence of participation constraints. Defineβ ≥ 0 to be the unique nonnegative solution of
Then the Stackelberg solution iŝ
Although we do not have a closed-form solution to the retailer's Stackelberg game, the next proposition (see the Appendix for a proof) provides a comparison between this equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6
The following five inequalities hold:
While inequalities (33)- (36) mirror our results for the supplier Stackelberg game, inequality (32) states that the customer service level, (1 − e −νs ) × 100%, is lower in the retailer's Stackelberg equilibrium than in the supplier's Stackelberg equilibrium (and the Nash equilibrium). Inequality (32) also implies that the retailer Stackelberg equilibrium is inefficient relative to the centralized solution. Analytical approximations (using e −x ≈ 1 − x in (30)) and numerical computations reveal that when the service level is close to 0 or 100%, both Stackelberg games have asymptotically the same service level. The maximum difference is approximately 9.5%, and is achieved when the service level is 76.0% for the supplier's Stackelberg game and 66.5% for the retailer's Stackelberg game. In a more practical example, if the supplier's Stackelberg service level is 90.0% then the retailer's Stackelberg service level is approximately 82%. Hence, the deterioration in customer service is not trivial, and if there is a leader the customers prefer that it is the supplier. This is because the base stock level is more effective than the capacity level at controlling the customer service level, and the retailer chooses a small base stock level when he is the leader. Figure 4 shows the competition penalty P for the Nash and Stackelberg games. The left graph plots P as a function of the backorder cost b for α = 0.5. Consistent with our discussion in §5, for α = 0.5 the competition penalty decreases with b for the Nash game. In contrast, for both Stackelberg games the competition penalty increases with the backorder rate. The other plot in Figure 4 displays the competition penalty as a function of α for b = 2. The inefficiency for the three games is U-shaped, and is minimized near α = 0.5. Moreover, all three games have a similar level of inefficiency as α → 0 and α → 1. Finally, Figure 4 also suggests that the retailer's Stackelberg game achieves a lower total system cost than the supplier's Stackelberg game. Evidently, the supplier, by owning the cost-driving resource, wreaks more havoc on his opponent as the leader than does the retailer. He holds less capacity, leading the retailer to incur considerable holding costs. The retailer holds less inventory (which is the customer-service-driving resource) when he leads, and the supplier's increase in capacity is not enough to compensate for the retailer's lower base stock level; consequently, customer service suffers.
Concluding Remarks
The distinguishing feature of our simple supply chain model is that congestion at the supplier's manufacturing facility is explicitly captured via a single-server queue. Each agent has a resource at his disposal (the supplier chooses the capacity level and the retailer chooses the base stock level) that buffers against expensive backorders of the retailer's inventory. When the inventory backorder cost is incurred entirely by the retailer (i.e., the backorder allocation fraction α = 1), the supplier has no incentive to build any excess capacity, which leads to system instability. Although the α = 1 assumption dominates the supply chain management literature, we believe that this extreme case has little practical relevance: even when the supplier has a monopoly and uses many retailers, he still cares about selling his product. When the supplier incurs some backorder cost (α ∈ [0, 1)), there is a unique Nash equilibrium that is always inefficient: The agents' selfish behavior degrades overall system performance. However, the Nash equilibrium is asymptotically efficient in two cases: (i) The backorder cost goes to zero and the supplier incurs all of the backorder cost, and (ii) the backorder cost goes to infinity and is split evenly between the two agents. The Nash equilibrium has an arbitrarily high inefficiency in two cases: (i) The backorder cost goes to infinity and the supplier incurs all of the backorder cost, and (ii) the retailer incurs all of the backorder cost. For most practical cases (i.e., backorder-to-holding cost ratio is greater than 2), the inefficiency of the Nash solution is smallest when the backorder costs are split relatively evenly between the two agents. This is likely to occur, for example, if the propensity of customers to switch brands (suppliers) or switch retailers are similar. Relative to the centralized solution, the agents in the Nash equilibrium have more buffer resources when they care sufficiently about backorders: The supplier builds more capacity than optimal when α < α ν (and α ν ≥ 0.28 if backorders are more expensive than holding inventory) and the retailer has a larger than optimal base stock level when α > 0.63 (and in some cases, an even smaller threshold). However, at least one of the agents in the Nash equilibrium holds a lower-than-optimal level of his buffer resource. Finally, customers receive better service in the centralized solution than in the Nash equilibrium, and customer service improves in the Nash setting when the retailer incurs most -but not all -of the backorder cost. It can be shown that if we give the customers the ability to fix one of the decision variables, supplier's production capacity or retailer's base stock level, then they would prefer to fix the base stock at a high level rather than selecting a high level of production capacity. Hence, while the capacity and the base stock level combine to provide a given service level, it appears that the retailer, being in direct contact with the customers, possesses the lever that can most effectively improve customer service. A linear transfer payment that induces cost sharing between the players coordinates the system. In the absence of participation constraints, coordination is always possible. A coordinating contract requires the parties to negotiate on the value of a single parameter (γ) that defines the split of the total system cost. The range of admissible values for γ increases with the magnitude of the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium. Hence, negotiations should be easier when the backorder costs are not split too evenly. However, if an agent absorbs 80% or more of the system backorder cost then this agent is willing to sign a contract that fully subsidizes the other agent's operation. Consequently, our model predicts that vertical integration would preclude the widespread prevalence of decentralized supply chains with extreme values of α. Although we did not incorporate participation constraints in the model, a straightforward analysis (see Caldentey and Wein) in a profit-maximization framework shows that there are values of α (in the proximity of 0 and 1) for which the contract will lead to the operation of an otherwise inoperative supply chain, i.e., the extra system profit generated by the contract is sufficient to entice the nonparticipating agent into playing.
Finally, when one of the agents is the Stackelberg leader, he builds less of his buffer resource and faces a lower cost than in the Nash equilibrium, and the other agent builds more of his buffer resource and pays a higher cost. The total system cost is less in the retailer Stackelberg game than in the supplier Stackelberg game. Because scarce capacity causes a nonlinear increase in delay, the supplier's leadership power causes more harm to the supply chain than the retailer's leadership power. Customer service is the same in the Nash equilibrium as when the supplier is the Stackelberg leader, but customers fare worse when the retailer is the leader. This latter effect is because the retailer holds less inventory when he is the leader, and the base stock level has a more direct impact on customer service than the supplier's capacity. Taken together, these results provide operations managers with a comprehensive understanding of the competitive interactions in this system, and offer guidelines for when (i.e., for which sets of problem parameters) and how to negotiate contracts to induce participation and increase profits.
Recall that our model is quite similar to the two-stage inventory model of Cachon and Zipkin: The main difference is the single-server vs. infinite-server model (i.e., queueing vs. inventory model) for the manufacturing process. Indeed, these two models can be viewed as the simplest prototypes for single-product, steady-state supply chains with no fixed ordering costs. In the extreme case when the supplier does not care about backorders (α = 1), he builds no excess capacity in our queueing model, whereas he holds no inventory in Cachon and Zipkin's inventory model. The effect of the former is an unstable system, while the effect of the latter is to turn the supply chain into a stable -albeit ineffective -make-toorder system. In Cachon and Zipkin's echelon inventory game, the Nash solution is indeed highly inefficient when α = 1, but in the local inventory game the median inefficiency in their computational study is only 1%. When α = 1 in the local inventory game, the supplier's base stock level offers him little control over the system's cost, whereas the capacity level in our model impacts the entire system in a more profound way. On the other hand, both models predict that the inefficiency is small when the backorder costs are shared equally. Another qualitative difference between the results in these two papers is that Cachon and Zipkin's agents hold generally less inventory (for the echelon inventory game) in the Nash equilibrium than in the centralized solution, whereas our agents build/hold a higher-than-optimal level of their buffer resource when their share of the backorder cost is large, as suggested in the management literature by Buzzell and Ortmeyer 1995 and others.
In our view, the make-to-stock queue is an attractive operations management model to embed into a game-theoretic framework. The model complements the newsvendor model by considering products with long life cycles, and is about as complex as -but considerably more tractable than -a two-stage Clark-Scarf model. It also allows us to capture the nonlinear effect of capacity on the supplier's lead times. Of course, none of these models attempt to mimic the complexities of an actual supply chain. Nevertheless, to the extent that queueing effects are present in manufacturers' production facilities, the make-to-stock queue is a parsimonious and tractable model for deriving new insights into multi-agent models for supply chain management. Thus, (s * , ν * ) is the unique global minimum for Π(s, ν).
Proof of Proposition 5. To derive the Stackelberg equilibrium, we find it convenient to define β = νs,
and rewrite the supplier's reaction curve (16) as
The one-to-one correspondence between the base stock level s and the service level parameter β (recall that the service level is e −β × 100%) allows the retailer in this Stackelberg game to choose β rather than s. By (3) and (37), the retailer's cost is
Solving (38) for s and using (37) gives
Substituting (40) 
Therefore, the first-order condition β 2 + (β + 2)(1 − (1 + αb)e −β ) 2(β + 1)
is sufficient for optimality. Because 1 + αb = e ν * α s * α and the denominator of (42) is always positive, condition (42) is equivalent to (30) . Hence, by (30) , (37) and (40), the Stackelberg equilibrium is given by (30)- (31) .
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove (32) , note that the left side of (30) is positive if β > ν * α s * α . Thus, the rootβ of (30) must satisfyβ ≤ ν * α s * α , i.e.,ν αŝα ≤ ν * α s * α . To show thatν α ≥ ν * α andŝ α ≤ s * α , we first observe that ν(s) = arg min ν>0 {C R (s, ν)} and 
In addition, the function e −β (β + 1)/β 2 is decreasing in β > 0. Hence, from (38) and inequality (32), we conclude thatŝ α ≤ s * α . Finally, (43) andŝ α ≤ s * α implies thatν α ≥ ν * α .
The retailer's cost in (41) is an increasing function of β for β ≥β. Hence, inequality (35) follows from (32) . To prove (36), i.e., C S (β * , ν * α ) ≤ C S (β,ν α ), we first use (4) to rewrite the supplier's cost as
The function C S (β, ν) is decreasing in β for ν > 0, and so inequality (32) implies that C S (β * ,ν α ) ≤ C S (β,ν α ). Hence the proof of (36) will follow if we can show that C S (β * , ν * α ) ≤ C S (β * ,ν α ). For any fixed nonnegative β, the function C S (β, ν) is convex in ν, achieves its only minimum at ν(β) = 1 + ln(1 + αb) = ν * α . This inequality and (33) imply that C S (β * , ν * α ) ≤ C S (β * ,ν α ), which completes the proof of (36).
